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Day: Tort Law: Childrent v. Advertisers: TV Torts--Is There a Duty?

TORT LAW: CHILDREN v. ADVERTISERS:
TV TORTS - IS THERE A DUTY?*
Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989)

Appellant sustained severe injuries' while performing a stunt portrayed in a television commercial.2 Because the commercial failed to
warn viewers that the stunt could be dangerous, appellant sued appel-

lee for negligence.3 Stating that appellant's injury was not reasonably
foreseeable, the United States District Court for the Middle District

of Florida found that appellees owed no duty to warn appellant and
dismissed the complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. 4

Appellant appealed.5 On certification,6 the Florida Supreme Court af-

*Dedicated to my husband and daughter, Clifford and Danielle Day, for their constant encouragement. The author thanks Sheila Canavan for her help and support.
1. 553 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 1989). Appellant, a fourteen-year-old boy, was rendered a
quadriplegic when attempting to ride his bicycle over a ramp built on an embankment some ten
to twelve feet above a pool of water. Initial Brief of Appellants at 2, Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc.,
553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989) (No. 73-258).
2. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164. Pepsico, Inc. broadcast a commercial advertising "Mountain
Dew" soda over network television. The commercial portrayed young people "lake jumping"
(riding bicycles up a ramp placed on an embankment over water and landing safely in the water).
Id.
3. Id. Appellant and his mother sued Pepsico, Inc. for negligence and for failure to warn
the targeted audience of young viewers of the potential dangers inherent in the activity. Appellants also claimed that the commercial induced appellant not only to purchase the advertised
product, but to imitate the lake jumping stunt. Id. Alleging that the accident was not reasonably
foreseeable and that the pleaded facts did not establish a causal connection between any duty
and a breach of that duty, appellee moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Sakon v.
Pepsico, Inc., No. 86-483-Civ-Orl-18, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 1987). Appellee argued
that the first amendment barred this action. Appellee contended that the advertisement was a
protected form of speech and there could be no liability because the advertisement did not fall
within one of the constitutionally recognized exceptions. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 165. This comment
will not discuss the first amendment argument.
4. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 86-483-Civ-Orl-18, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 1988)
(dismissing an amended complaint and incorporating by reference the facts and reasoning of the
March, 1987 opinion).
5. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164.
6.

See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6) (granting the Florida Supreme Court the authority

to review questions certified by a United States Court of Appeals that are determinative of the
cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified the following question:
WHETHER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA RECOGNIZES A DUTY OWED
BY A TELEVISION ADVERTISER TO ITS TARGETED AUDIENCE OF YOUNG VIEW-
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firmed 7 and HELD, when an advertiser portrays a dangerous activity
in a television commercial, the advertiser has no duty to warn its
targeted audience of young viewers regarding the potential danger of
engaging in that activity."
In the early days of television, the common law did not recognize
a nexus between television advertising and tort liability.9 In fact,
during the 1950s, social scientists believed that the new medium of
television had little effect on its viewers. 10 Subsequent research on
the effects of television on children, however, changed these early
notions., Several studies revealed that children are particularly vulnerable to the influences of television 2 and are unable to understand
the persuasive intent of advertisements. 13 Specifically, when advertisers link a fun activity with the use of a product, the commercial
4
becomes the impetus for the child's desire to mimic the activity.
Indeed, the legal system long has recognized that "[c]hildren have a
very special place in life which law should reflect.' 5 Florida tort law
acknowledges this view by requiring that the public exercise a higher
degree of care when dealing with children than with adults. 16 The

ERS WHEN THAT ADVERTISER HAS BROADCAST, WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNINGS, A COMMERCIAL DEPICTING A DANGEROUS ACTIVITY IN A MANNER
LIKELY TO INDUCE A YOUNG VIEWER TO IMITATE THE ACTIVITY. Sakon, 553 So.
2d at 164.
7. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167. The Florida Supreme Court did not agree with appellee's
contention that commercial speech is totally undifferentiated from noncommercial speech and is
afforded full protection under the first amendment. Although the court discussed first amendment
considerations, it based the holding on tort principles. Id. at 166-67.
8. Id. at 166. Justice McDonald dissented with no written opinion. Id. at 167 (McDonald,
J., dissenting).
9. Cf. Krattenmaker & Powe, Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and
Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 1123, 1168-70 (1978).
10. Id. at 1135.
11. See id. at 1134-35. Social scientists have suggested three different theories on the effects
of television on viewers. First, the teaching hypothesis suggests that viewers learn by observation. The notion of television as a surrogate teacher explains how children, for example, learn
the alphabet by watching "Sesame Street." Id. at 1135. The second theory advances the notion
that viewing televised violence causes subsequent aggression against individuals or property.
Id. Finally, other researchers have concluded viewers become more afraid and less perceptive
of the real world from watching televised violence. Id. at 1135-36.
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, No. 82-1195, TELEVISION AND
BEHAVIOR: TEN YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EIGHTIES

2 (1982) [hereinafter

TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR].

13. Id. at 193.
14. See supra notes 9 & 11-12 and accompanying text; see also infra note 77.
15. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
16. See Bagdad Land & Lumber Co. v. Boyette, 104 Fla. 699, 701, 140 So. 798, 800 (1932);
see also Williams v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Miami Paper Co.
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC),17 the federal agency that regulates
advertising, also recognizes this protectionist approach and bans certain commercials based on the belief that children mimic what they
see on television.18
Television is a highly regulated industry. 19 The FTC routinely bans
television commercials that encourage children to engage in harmful
activities.2 In In re General Foods Corp., the FTC investigated complaints regarding a "Grape-Nuts" television commercial.2 ' The cereal
advertisement depicted an actor in natural surroundings picking fruit
off of cacti and cranberry bushes.2 The FTC found that this advertisement could influence children to consume potentially harmful raw
plants.23

v. Johnston, 58 So. 2d 869, 870-71 (Fla. 1952); Bilams v. Metropolitan Transit Auth., 371 So.
2d 693, 695 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979). In these "darting-out" cases, drivers of motor vehicles are
held to a very high degree of care when the drivers have reason to believe that children may
be present in the area.
17. See R. HARRIS, A COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MASS COMMUNICATION 75 (1989).
The FTC is the watchdog agency regulating advertising. The FTC was established in the earlier
twentieth century when "trust-busting" of big corporations was a major concern. Id.
18. See R. ADLER, THE EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ADVERTISING ON CHILDREN 1-2
(1980). The FTC has the power to act on commercials on a case-by-case basis, as well as to
issue broad trade rules and regulations that can restrict or require certain advertising practices.
Id. at 4. The FTC, for the most part, has dealt with children's advertising by evaluating
individual commercials. Id. Historically, the FTC has demonstrated a reluctance to impose
specific regulations on advertisers, preferring to allow the industry to regulate itself. Id.
The FTC bans commercials through consent orders that are agreed to by the advertiser and
do not include an admission of fault. If after the FTC investigation, the advertiser cannot
substantiate the commercial or agree to the consent order, the FTC may refer the matter to
an administrative law judge. Telephone interview with member of the legal staff, Division of
Advertising, Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 27, 1990).
19. See Note, Regulation of Programming Content to Protect Children After Pacifica, 32
VAND. L. REV. 1377, 1399 (1979).
20. See R. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 75. The FTC has regulated children's advertising
more vigorously and with stricter regulations than commercials aimed at adults. The FTC was
more aggressively proconsumerist during the 1970s than at any other time. Id. During the
1970s, the FTC focused on deceptive advertising and children's ads. This focus changed in the
1980s with increasing deregulation and the probusiness philosophy of the Reagan administration.
Id. In 1983, the FTC abolished its children's TV guidelines. In 1984, the FTC lifted the limits
allowed for commercial time per hour. Id.
21. 86 F.T.C. 831 (1975); see also AMF, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 310 (1980) (banned advertisement
depicting children riding bicycles in an unsafe manner); Mego Int'l, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 186 (1978)
(banned doll commercial showing child using hair dryer near sink with water); Uncle Ben's,
Inc., 89 F.T.C. 131 (1977) (banned an advertisement depicting unsupervised children cooking
rice using the stove).
22. General Foods, 86 F.T.C. at 834-37.
23. Id. at 838.
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FTC decisions are not legally binding precedent and do not create
a private cause of action.2 Nevertheless, under the rubric of unfair
and deceptive practices,2 the FTC banned the GeneralFoods commercial.26 Because the commercial suggested that raw plants are edible,
the FTC reasoned that the commercial might cause young children to
pick and eat fruit from wild plants.- Since children cannot distinguish
between plants that may or may not be harmful, the commercial
created an imminent risk of physical harm to immature viewers.Concluding that this imminent risk was reasonably foreseeable, the
FTC banned the commercial.Foreseeability of risk similarly prompted the California Supreme
Court to hold a radio broadcaster liable for the effects of its broadcast
in Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.30 Appellees brought a wrongful death
action against appellant radio station.31 The radio station conducted a
contest and awarded a prize to the first contestant who located a
roving disc jockey who was broadcasting live from various locations.
Two teens listening to the broadcast collided with another motorist,
appellees' decedent, while racing to the next location.The Weirum court upheld appellees' recovery from appellant radio
broadcaster on a theory of negligence.- Recognizing that appellant
owed a duty to decedent, the court allowed the jury to decide the
question of foreseeability based on the facts. The jury concluded that
appellant could have foreseen that this contest, an exciting promotion
seeking to entice new listeners, would cause teens to race from location
to location without regard for highway safety.3
Although the Weirum court acknowledged various possible bases
for the imposition of a duty,3' 7 the court primarily relied on the foreseea-

24. See Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974).
25. General Foods, 86 F.T.C. at 838.
26. Id. at 840.
27. See id. at 838, 840.
28. Id. at 840.
29. Id.
30. 15 Cal.3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
31. Id. at 43, 539 P.2d at 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
32. Id. The radio station had a large teenage audience. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 47-48, 51, 539 P.2d at 40, 42, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 474.
35. Id. at 46, 539 P.2d at '39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
36. Id. at 46-47, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
37. Id. at 46, 539 P.2d at "89, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471. The court listed the following considerations as important in justifying the imposition of a duty in a particular circumstance: history,
concepts of morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judgment as to where
the loss should fall. Id. (citing Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953)).
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bility of injury. The Weirum court affirmed the jury's finding that
the automobile accident was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of
the broadcast. 39 The "slippery slope"4° argument that imposing a duty
on the broadcasters in Weirum would lead to an avalanche of obligations imposed on other broadcasters did not persuade the court. 41
One federal court, however, feared the "slippery slope" effect and
accordingly refused to extend the law of negligence in Florida to the
milieu of broadcaster and viewer.42 In Zamorav. Columbia Broadcasting System, plaintiff sued three broadcasting companies. 43 The claim
alleged that all three defendants routinely broadcast violent shows
that caused plaintiff to become addicted to viewing television violence.
The claim also alleged that the defendants' shows had desensitized
the plaintiff to actual violence and had incited the defendant to duplicate the portrayed violence. 44
Because plaintiff failed to narrow the focus of his complaint to one
network and one specific, particularly violent show, the Zamora court
dismissed the complaint. 45 While the court acknowledged a foreseeability problem inherent in the broad allegations of the complaint,46 its
greatost concern was a lack of articulable standards. 47 Without clear,
measurable guidelines for broadcaster defendants to follow, the court
feared a "slippery slope" effect which would expose broadcasters to
potentially unlimited liability.48 The court deemed itself incapable of
setting standards for media dissemination without significantly expanding Florida's tort law.49 The Zamora court recognized, however,

38.
39.
40.

Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
Id. at 47, 51, 539 P.2d at 40, 42, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 474.
Id. at 48, 539 P.2d at 40-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472-73. "Slippery slope" refers to an

assertion that recognizing a cause of action in the instant case will lead to limitless liability
upon an indeterminate amount of potential defendants. Id. Cf. Scales, Feminists in the Field
of Time, 42 FLA. L. REV. 95, 115-16 (1990) (discussing slippery slope arguments as always

entailing some causal "crackpotism.").
41.
42.

Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 48, 539 P.2d at 40-41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472-73.
Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).

43. Id. at 200.
44. Id.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 202-03. The court said that "[s]tripped of its conclusory language, the standard

demanded is so devoid of guidance and so lacking in a showing of legal cause that the complaint
must be dismissed." Id. at 203.
48. Id. at 202.
49.

Id. at 203.
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that "medical or other sciences"- must one day provide evidence which
would enable future courts to enunciate appropriate standards. 1
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court refused to recognize
a television advertiser's duty to warn its immature audience that a
depicted activity was dangerous.52 The court determined that the appellee's commercial encouraged young viewers only to drink "Mountain
Dew" and not to attempt the dangerous sport of "lake jumping." 5
Therefore, the instant court concluded that appellee could not have
foreseen appellant's injuries as a consequence of the advertisement.5
Without the element of foreseeability, the instant court reasoned that
appellee owed appellant no duty. Therefore, appellant's complaint
failed to state a cause of action. 5
In addition to its conclusion that appellant's injuries were not
foreseeable, the instant court cited a fear of the "slippery slope" effect
as a reason for dismissing appellant's cause of action.-rConcerned that
recognizing a duty in the instant case would lead to liability of "swordswallowers" and "high-wire walkers" to circus viewers 57 the court
limited the kinds of injuries for which media defendants will be liable.
The instant court stressed the need to draw practical lines so that
liability will not crush those who must bear its weight.5 9
The need to draw practical lines is related to the problem of providing recognizable standards to measure liability.6 Tracking the lan-

50. Id. at 206-07.
51. Id. at 207.
52. Sakon v. Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989). The instant court addressed first
amendment considerations because appellee contended that the court should decline to answer
the certified question in view of appellee's first amendment protection. The instant court determined that commercial speech is clearly differentiated from noncommercial speech and is afforded
only a limited measure of protection. Id. at 164-65. Common sense, according to the instant
court, can differentiate between television programs and advertisements. Id. at 166. The court
concluded that the first amendment would not prohibit a cause of action for false, misleading,
or deceptive advertising. Id. at 166. Concluding that instant case did not present such an action,
the instant court finished its first amendment discussion. Id. The court proceeded to answer
the certified question with an analysis of tort principles. Id. at 166-67.
53. Id. at 166-67.
54. Id. at 166.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 167.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 166 (quoting 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.4,
at 131-32 (2d ed. 1986)).
60. Id. (paraphrasing 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.4,
at 131-32 (2d ed. 1986)).
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guage of Zamora,61 the instant court addressed both the lack of standards and the resulting unpredictability in the law.6 The instant court
feared that recognizing appellant's cause of action would result in a

total absence of any standards for the television industry to follow.c
In discussing the difficulty of setting standards, the instant court

adopted the words of the federal district judge to determine what warning would suffice to avoid liability in the "Mountain Dew" commercial.6
"[S]hould it specify the depth of the water[,]... [that the viewer] must
be able to swim[, and] ... [h]ow to prevent the bicycle from injuring

him"?6 The instant court acknowledged the lack of clarity in this area
yet refused to set standards for television advertisers to follow.6 The
instant court did not recognize FTC cases as binding or even persuasive precedent.6 Finding no decision in the United States imposing
liability under similar circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court refused to'do so.68
By refusing to recognize a cause of action and provide clear stand-

ards, 69 the instant court established a no-duty rule 7" and furthered a
defendant-protective policy. The Florida Supreme Court ignored the
clear message of the FTC's regulatory rulings banning commercials
that endanger children's lives, such as the one examined in General
Foods.7 ' Like the advertisement in the instant case,72 the General

61. See Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 202.
62. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 167.
65. Id.; see also Sakon v. Mountain Dew, No. 86-483-Civ Orl-18, slip op. at 5-7 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 1987) (language used by federal district judge).
66. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167.
67. See id. at 166.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 167. The court noted that the plaintiff wanted the court to hold, as a matter of
law, that the allegations of the complaint created a cause of action in favor of plaintiffs against
the defendant. Id.
70. Id.
71. General Foods, 86 F.T.C. at 837-40; see supra notes 17 & 20-21 and accompanying
text. See also Federal Trade Commission Issues Policy Statement on its Enforcement of Deceptive Acts and Practices, Federal Trade Commission News, Oct. 24, 1983, at 1. The FTC listed
three elements necessary for it to find that deception has occurred. (1) There must be a representation or omission likely to mislead the consumer. (2) The representation or omission must be
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. "The test is whether
the consumer's interpretation or reaction is reasonable." Id. When representations are targeted
to a specific audience, such as children, the Commission determines the effect of the practice
on an ordinary member of that group. (3) The representation, omissions, or practice must be
a "material" one. A claim is material if it is likely to affect consumer behavior. Id.
72. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

Foods commercial portrayed a dangerous activity unrelated to the use
of the product itself.- Despite this fact, the FTC banned the General
Foods commercial,- 4 sending a strong message that the depiction of
such activity foreseeab]y could result in an immature viewer's imitation
and subsequent harm, 5 regardless of the advertiser's intention.
The instant court also ignored numerous scientific studies76 which
indicate that television directly affects children's actions.- Advertisers
routinely and purposefully link products, particularly soft drinks, with
fun activities.78 The product then becomes an integral part of the
activity and, more importantly, the good feelings associated with the
activity. 79 The result is that the viewer is encouraged not only to buy
the product, but also to engage in the activity. 8° This advertising
practice,81 coupled with the law's long-accepted protectionist attitude
toward children,- strongly supports a finding that advertisers have a
duty to warn against dangerous activities when targeting an immature
audience.
The Florida Supreme Court, however, found appellant's actions
unforeseeable and concluded that a duty to warn did not exist. 3 Indeed, its conviction was so strong in this regard that, unlike the
Weirum court, the instant court refused to allow a jury even to
examine the foreseeability question.8 Admittedly, the Weirum facts

73. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
74. GeneralFoods, 86 F.T.C. at 839-40; see also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
75. General Foods, 86 F.T.C. at 839-40.
76. See, e.g., supra notes 9, 11, 12 & 17; see also infra note 77.
77. See R. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 65-72. Advertisements are created not only to
persuade and influence but to affect the reality perceived by the consumer. Advertising attempts
to change our attitudes. Our attitudes about products (or persons and ideas) have three components. Id. at 66. The belief or cognition is the informational content of the attitude. Id. The
affective (emotional) content of the attitude is the feeling toward that product. Id. Finally, the
intention to act is potential translation of the attitude into behavior. Id. at 71. An advertiser
attempts to influence our beliefs or feelings in order to change our behavior. Id. at 66.
78. Id. at 66-67. "Any type of media advertising whether print or broadcast, uses a variety
of psychological appeals to reach the viewer. It attempts to tie the product or service to our
deepest and most basic psychological needs . . . . Influencing emotions is often the best first
step to influencing beliefs and ultimately behavior." Id.
79. Id. at 67.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
83. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166-67.
84. Id.; see Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d at 46, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72; see also
Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (affirming judgment for nonsuit where plaintiff was artificially raped by assailants who
recreated a scene from a NBC movie Born Innocent), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108, reh'g denied,
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may provide a clearer path to liability than those of the instant case.
The Florida Supreme Court's function, however, was not to find ultimate liability,1 but only to determine if, based on the foreseeability
of these facts, liability potentially could exist . 7 In light of FTC rulings,s numerous scientific studies,8 and the protectionist policy of the
law toward children, 9° the instant court erred in failing to recognize
that appellant's actions were sufficiently foreseeable.
The instant court's second basis for its ruling, fear of the "slippery
slope" effect, echoed the Zamora holding.91 The court emphasized the
need to draw a line to limit broadcaster liability.9 The instant court,'

nonetheless, failed to recognize the distinction between advertisements

458 U.S. 1132 (1982); Walt Disney Prod., Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981)
(suit barred by first amendment where plaintiff became blind after attempting to reproduce a
sound effect demonstrated on a television show); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446
A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (affirming summary judgment for defendants where teen hung himself
after viewing hanging stunt on Johnny Carson show); cf. Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune
Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (summary judgment for defendants denied
where plaintiff injured by person using magazine's "gun for hire" advertisement). In all these
cases the plaintiffs were suing the broadcasting companies or publisher claiming that their
injuries were a foreseeable consequence of the respective publications. These courts recognized
the plaintiffs' cause of action. However, none of the plaintiffs recovered damages. In Olivia,
Shannon, and DeFilippo, the courts applied the constitutional test for liability under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Olivia, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 494-95, 178 Cal. Rptr. at
892-93; Shannon, 247 Ga. at 403-04, 276 S.E.2d at 582; DeFilippo,446 A.2d at 1042. Brandenburg
requires speech excepted from full protection of the first amendment to meet the test of 'nciting
or producing imminent lawless activity." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. In the above three
cases, although the court recognized a cause of action, plaintiffs did not meet this higher test
for liability, as compared to negligence. Because broadcasters were the party defendants, the
first amendment protections applied.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
86. Initially foreseeability is a question of law addressed when considering "whether the
policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences which have
in fact occurred." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 42, at 273 (5th ed.
1984). Then foreseeability becomes a matter to submit to the jury as a question of fact. See J.
LITTLE, TORTS: THE CIVIL LAW OF REPARATION FOR HARM DONE BY WRONGFUL ACT
§ 8.02 (1985).
87. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 86, at 273.
88. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 9, 11, 12 & 17.
90. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
91. Compare Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167 (describing the problems that an advertiser would
face in assessing the sufficiency of a consumer warning in an advertisement) with Zamora, 480
F. Supp. at 202 (describing the difficulties that courts would encounter in interpreting a cause
of action based upon advertiser liability). See also supranotes 48 & 56 and accompanying text.
92. See Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167; Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 202-03.
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and entertainment programs. 93 Despite the court's fears, common sense
can differentiate between television commercials and television programs.- Because of their persuasive nature,9 5 television commercials
are inherently different from all other television programs.9 Therefore,
finding a duty based on the instant facts would not affect as large a
portion of the television industry as the instant court suggests.
Citing Zamora, the instant court also acknowledged that the lack
of clear standards to guide future courts in similar cases compounds
the potential "slippery slope" effect.9 But unlike the instant case the
Zamora plaintiff sued three broadcasting companies and made broad,
general allegations.9 In contrast, the instant case alleged specific complaints against appellee advertiser.99 Indeed, it would be difficult to
articulate standards applicable to the broad allegations in Zamora.
The similarity of the instant facts to those of General Foods,,however, could have assisted the instant court by providing some
guidance. The FTC based its decision to ban the General Foods commercial on clear standards formulated by a regulatory arm of the
federal government.'10 While FTC rulings are not binding precedent, 102

the very existence of these standards could have assisted the court
in formulating legal standards for future cases. Moreover, because
Florida law recognizes regulations such as those enunciated by the

93. See Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
94. See Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 167; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 77-78.
96. Id.
97. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 166 (citing Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp.
199, 202 (S.D. Fla. 1979)); see also supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
98. Zamora, 480 F. Supp. at 199-200; see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
99. Sakon, 553 So. 2d at 164; see also supra note 3.
100. Compare GeneralFoods, 86 F.T.C. at 832-38 (defendant's television commercial alleged
to have induced children to eat plants growing in natural surroundings) with Sakon v. Pepsico,
Inc., 553 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 1989) (defendant's television commercial alleged to have influenced
and attracted young people to imitate bicycle stunt).
101. General Foods, 86 F.T.C. at 838. The Federal Trade Commission identified three
factors to consider in analyzing unfair and deceptive trade practices under § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1989): "(1) Whether the practice injures consumers; (2)
Whether it violates established public policy; (3) Whether it is unethical or unscrupulous." Letter
from Staff of Federal Trade Comm'n to Senators Ford and Danforth 4 (Dec. 17, 1980) (paraphrasing the Federal Trade Comm'n, Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive
Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoldng, 29 Fed.
Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964) (Part 408 added to ch. 1, Title 16 C.F.R., issued under Fed. Trade
Comm'n Act, as amended 38 Stat. 717, as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.67)).
See also R. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 75.
102. See Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol42/iss2/4

10

Day: Tort Law: Childrent v. Advertisers: TV Torts--Is There a Duty?
CASE COMMENTS

FTC in General Foods as evidence of a standard of care, 1°3 the instant
court should have acknowledged their persuasive value in this case.
The law of negligence has long recognized that the standard of
care owed to children is higher than that owed to adults.10 In contrast,

the instant case does not articulate a child-protective policy. The pervasive presence of television in American livesos and its unique accessibility to children,06 are reasons to view the instant court's decision

with a critical eye.
The instant court created a rule that television advertisers owe no

duty to warn their targeted audience of young viewers about dangerous activity. In so doing, the court refused to recognize the foreseeable
influence that television advertisements have on children's subsequent
behavior, despite research 1° which affrms such a correlation. Given
empirical evidence indicating that children are more vulnerable to

television messages than adults, m the instant court erred in dismissing

103. See, e.g., DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973)
(violation of a statute may be evidence of negligence or negligence per se); St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. v. Burlison, 262 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1972) (safety rules of the
American Association of Railroads are evidence of a standard of care); Grand Union Co. v.
Rocker, 454 So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984) (provisions of the South Fla. Bldg. Code are
evidence of a standard of care); Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222,
1225 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978) (failure to adhere to FAA regulations can be evidence of negligence
and the jury can be instructed regarding the violation of regulations).
104. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
105. See TELEVISION AND BEHAVIOR, supra note 12, at 1. More Americans have television
than have refrigerators or indoor plumbing. Id. The law has recognized the power of TV to
influence potential jurors in cases involving the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity and the
court's ability to "gag" the press. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)
(criminal defendant may have press barred from courtroom, but only by showing that other
alternatives either are unreasonable or will not insure a fair trial). Last year, the New York
Times reported a story about a plaintiffs attorney who claimed jurors were influenced by an
episode of "L.A. Law." Skipp, Jurors' TV Viewing Is Growing Issue, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28,
1989, at B9, col. 1. In the December 7 episode, a doctor was found not liable in a malpractice
case. The next day, a jury in New Port Richey, Florida, found two physicians not guilty in a
malpractice suit involving the death of a woman undergoing a gallbladder operation. Id. See
generally Minow, 'Impartial'Juries: Trial by Ignorance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1989, at A29,
col. 2; Wimes, Judge in North Case Angered by ABC News Report, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1989,
at A23, col. 1.
106.
See R. HARRIS, supranote 17, at 21-23. A TV set is "on" in U.S. households over 7
hours a day (over 8 hours for homes with cable and subscription services), with the typical adult
or child watching 2 to 3 hours per day, more time than they spend on any other activity except
working and sleeping. Id. at 22. The average child sees 20,000 advertisements per year, 360,000
by age 18. Id. He or she also sees 9000 scenes of suggested sexual intercourse or innuendo on
prime-time TV each year and has witnessed 11,000 televised murders by age 14. Id. at 22.
107. See supranotes 9-11 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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appellants' cause of action and refusal to permit a jury to decide
liability. Fears of potentially unlimited liability of those in the television and entertainment field are unwarranted. Applying common sense
in future cases will avoid the "slippery slope" effect. Finally, the court
failed to seize the opportunity to create at least minimal guidelines
for broadcasters to follow. The instant court chose maintaining workable rules over furthering loss-allocative and child-protective policies.
The precedent set by the instant decision prevents vulnerable childplaintiffs from seeking compensatory justice from an industry that is
expert' °9 at influencing behavior through the powerful medium of television.
Terri Day
109.

See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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